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Roughly one third of U.S. voters will cast their ballots this November on touchscreen voting machines. Controversy has surrounded the reliability of these machines since their introduction, and accusations of tampering have abounded. Now a new argument has arisen over the secrecy surrounding the testing processes for these machines. The three companies charged with certifying the voting machines have refused to disclose their test results, stating that they are bound to secrecy by the terms of their contracts with the voting machine manufacturers.
According to Federal regulations, voting systems must be certified by a third party tester. However, no government oversight for the testing process exists, and no law requires public disclosure of the test results. Validation of many of the new voting systems has been slow, leading many to wonder what flaws are being uncovered. With the election looming, states that plan to use the touchscreen systems are rushing to do their own tests or are buying uncertified machines. Recent, well-publicized failures of electronic voting methods in several states have only reinforced fears about the possibilities of voting errors or tampering. Furthermore, many of the touchscreen systems do not produce paper records, which could be invaluable in case of recounts during another closely contested Presidential election.
At the heart of this issue are the same secrecy issues that drive high-profile lawsuits over software code copyrights. The manufacturers of touchscreen voting machines are all in competition to fill the glut of demand for new voting systems. Add to that the already sour impression the public has of electronic voting, and it's easy to see why those companies would want to keep any technical difficulties under wraps. The question is whether the political direction of voting districts in the US or abroad should be decided by an opaque voting process. The manufacturers contend that public disclosure of the hardware designs and software code for voting machines would make tampering even easier.
On the other hand, a voting system understood only by a few corporations and producing inadequete records is a recipe for another election fiasco. Without some kind of verified voting capability in place, there may be no easy way to track down serious discrepancies in the voting record. After all the talk of improving our voting systems after the Florida 2000 debacle, it seems as though the nation has yet to figure out a solution. How embarassing will it be if the United States has to blame two contested Presidential elections in a row on lousy voting equipment?
Personally, this is one of the many reasons why I feel voting this year is somewhat frivilous and futile. Discuss.
According to Federal regulations, voting systems must be certified by a third party tester. However, no government oversight for the testing process exists, and no law requires public disclosure of the test results. Validation of many of the new voting systems has been slow, leading many to wonder what flaws are being uncovered. With the election looming, states that plan to use the touchscreen systems are rushing to do their own tests or are buying uncertified machines. Recent, well-publicized failures of electronic voting methods in several states have only reinforced fears about the possibilities of voting errors or tampering. Furthermore, many of the touchscreen systems do not produce paper records, which could be invaluable in case of recounts during another closely contested Presidential election.
At the heart of this issue are the same secrecy issues that drive high-profile lawsuits over software code copyrights. The manufacturers of touchscreen voting machines are all in competition to fill the glut of demand for new voting systems. Add to that the already sour impression the public has of electronic voting, and it's easy to see why those companies would want to keep any technical difficulties under wraps. The question is whether the political direction of voting districts in the US or abroad should be decided by an opaque voting process. The manufacturers contend that public disclosure of the hardware designs and software code for voting machines would make tampering even easier.
On the other hand, a voting system understood only by a few corporations and producing inadequete records is a recipe for another election fiasco. Without some kind of verified voting capability in place, there may be no easy way to track down serious discrepancies in the voting record. After all the talk of improving our voting systems after the Florida 2000 debacle, it seems as though the nation has yet to figure out a solution. How embarassing will it be if the United States has to blame two contested Presidential elections in a row on lousy voting equipment?
Personally, this is one of the many reasons why I feel voting this year is somewhat frivilous and futile. Discuss.
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